Wednesday, November 30, 2011

What Appointment Setting is About

It is a fact that appointment setting is very important. Whether you may agree or not, the truth is that any business can’t survive minus appointment setting process. Appointment setting is about identifying the prospects and setting business meeting where sales and marketing representatives and the prospects can discuss business matters personally.


You could look for several firms providing appointment setting services. You have to provide them a prospects list and they’ll set business appointments with them for your sales and marketing staff. However, the reality of the procedure is a far cry from what is usually believed and prior to hiring a consultant. First, you have to ask, “Does this course of action lead to improved and enhanced sales productivity?”


More often, many has considered appointment setting to be a myth since plenty of telemarketing companies will merely begin to call your prospects sans even having real familiarity and understanding of whatever your firm is providing and why the prospect is interested in setting appointments. It occurs on a lot of instances that prospects be in agreement for your sales representatives to meet, but then most of the meetings don’t end up in fruitful results. And some prospects might not even remember an appointment has been set in the first place. Any unqualified appointments like that can really add to the cost.


In order to maximize appointment setting attempts, if at all possible, you must contract a call center to whom you not merely delegate the appointment setting programs, but one who can give the solutions. A company like that can pack client forecasts and then establish major appointments—and not simply halfhearted or lackluster meetings. And aside from that, also be certain that their professional sales and marketing representatives could serve the solutions you require to increase sales leads, etc.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Copyright Infringement: Repeat Willful Violations Result in Permanent Injunction and High Damages

In a recent opinion, Seoul Broadcasting System Intl. v. Ro, an Alexandria U.S. district court granted Plaintiffs a permanent injunction and ordered steep damages against the defendants who were repeat copyright infringers and willfully ignored cease and desist letters, signifying a focus on deterrence to protect copyrights of businesses.

Plaintiffs Seoul Broadcasting Corporation, Mun Hwa Broadcasting Corporation, and KBS America, Inc., profit from the sale and licensing of DVDs and videotapes of their proprietary programming and distribute Korean-language television programming in the United States.

Plaintiff accused Defendants, Daewood Video, Inc. and owner Young Min Ro., Korean Korner, Inc., Sun Yop Yoo, of illegally distributing television programming. All Defendants are or were previously in the business of renting or selling videos and had past licensing agreements with Plaintiffs which had expired or were not renewed.

The current opinion is a result of a bench trial held on the issue of damages and other relief. The court previously granted summary judgment of copyright infringement in favor of Plaintiffs.

In copyright actions, courts traditionally grant permanent injunctions if liability is established and there is a continuing threat to the copyright. Opinion at 14, quoting Dea Han Video Prod., Inc. v. Chun, et al., No. 89-1470-A, 1990 WL 265976 at *1311 (E.D. Va. June 18, 1990). The court decided to issue a permanent injunction in this case because the Daewood defendants, with assistance from Korean Korner and Yoo, infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights continuously over a period of more than a year. And Defendants, save one, all had a history of unlawful copying and selling Korean video programming. Moreover, the ease of making the copies made it more likely Defendants would infringe in the future if a permanent injunction was not entered.

The court considered in depth the damages award. Statutory damages in copyright infringement cases, according to 17 U.S.C. § 504, are significantly higher if the court finds the infringement was done willfully. The damages imposed may be up to $150,000 per act of infringement. Opinion at 16.

“Willfulness may be inferred where there is evidence that infringements continued after warnings or cease and desist letters from the plaintiff.” Opinion at 16, citing Masterfile Corp. v. Dev. Partners, Inc., No. 1:10cv134, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100857, 14-15 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2010). All Plaintiffs had sent cease and desist letters to Young Min Ro, owner of Daewood Video.

The court awarded monetary damages, with a significantly higher damages award against Daewood Video, Inc. and owner Young Min Ro due to previous copyright infringement violations and because the court found that they acted willfully by refusing to follow the cease and desist letters. Daewood and Ro, jointly and severally, were ordered to pay $555,000.00. Defendant Yoo, the one defendant without a history of copyright infringement, was ordered to pay a considerably less amount of $16,951. These disparate amounts and steep fines for Daewood and Ro suggest the court’s unyielding desire to deter repeat violators from ignoring laws set up to protect businesses.

A question is whether courts will use refusal to follow cease and desist letters as a justification for high damages awards in suits other than those involving copyright issues.

Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Spiteful Motives, Lacking Improper Conduct, do not Support Tortious Interference Claim

In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that actions motivated solely by ill will or personal spite, that don’t include improper conduct, do not support a claim for tortious interference with an at-will contract. The court provided a helpful definition of when conduct is considered improper and decided that it is not enough if the actions were merely spiteful. Click here for the opinion.

The facts of the case involve a Virginia law firm, Dunn, McCormack & Macpherson (“Dunn”), who had an at-will contract with the Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing Authority (the “Authority”). Dunn had served as legal counsel for the Authority for around thirty years until the Authority terminated the contract in September 2005.

Dunn sued Gerald Connolly (“Connolly”), Chairman of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, alleging that Connolly tortiously interfered with Dunn’s contract with the Authority by persuading Authority to break the contract. Dunn claimed that Connolly’s actions were motived solely by his personal spite, ill will and malice, because he didn’t get along with a partner at Dunn.

The circuit court entered an order dismissing the action for Dunn’s failure to provide facts showing Connolly used illegal means or improper methods when he communicated with the Authority. This court reviewed the circuit court’s ruling de novo and came to the same conclusion.

The elements to support a cause of action for tortious interference with contract rights are: (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy, (2) knowledge of the relationship or expdctancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy, and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. Additionally, when a contract is at-will, an element is added: the defendant must have employed improper methods. Op. at 6, citing Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 226-27, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1987).

The court explained that interference is improper if it is illegal, independently tortious, or violates an established standard of trade or profession. The court quoted the Duggin case, stating:

Methods of interference considered improper are those means that are illegal or independently tortious, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules. Improper methods may include violence, threats or intimidation, bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, defamation, duress, undue influence, misuse of inside or confidential information, or breach of a fiduciary relationship. . . .

Methods also may be improper because they violate and established standard of a trade or profession, or involve unethical conduct. Sharp dealing, overreaching, or unfair competition may also constitute improper methods.

234 Va. at 227-28, 360 S.E.2d at 836-37.

Dunn’s argument that Connolly improperly interfered with its terminable at-will contract with the Authority because his actions were motived solely by Connolly’s personal spite, ill will and malice was found to be insufficient. The court found that Dunn failed to appreciate the limited nature of what constitutes “improper” interference. The court stated that it “will not extend the scope of the tort to include actions solely motivated by spite, ill will and malice.” Op. at 7. Because there were no facts alleged that showed improper interference, there was no merit to Dunn’s claim and the action was dismissed.